Candidatures 2012

Par Pierre Arnaud, 6 avril 2012 13:30

Les dossiers d’inscription pour les sélections de 2012/2013 sont à présent disponibles au téléchargement.

Télécharger ici.

Le dossier est à retourner impérativement avant : le 8 juin 2012 pour la session principale (entretiens après sélection avant la fin du mois de juin) ; le 3 septembre 2012 pour la session supplémentaire (entretiens après sélection avant le 21 septembre)

Réunion d’information

Par Pierre Arnaud, 24 avril 2011 9:27

La réunion d’information pour les étudiants souhaitant postuler pour l’année 2012-2013 aura lieu le :

Mardi 20 mars à 18h30

Bâtiment V, 3e étage, salle V311

Université Nanterre Paris Ouest La Défense

Prochainement

Par Pierre Arnaud, 31 janvier 2011 16:42

La rubrique Actualités, où vous pourrez trouver des interviews des anciens, de nos partenaires-entreprise, notre page débat et la présentation de la promotion actuelle.

Orientez-moi

Par Pierre Arnaud, 31 janvier 2011 16:15

Retrouvez le Master 2 Affaires Internationales de l’Université Nanterre sur OrientezMoi et déposez votre avis sur la formation.

Forum de Paris

Par Pierre Arnaud, 31 janvier 2011 16:06


Des étudiants du master AINI participeront au forum de Paris 2010 à travers des fiches pays. La fiche pays est un document dans le quel sera présenté, brièvement, un pays méditerranéen.

La Newsletter de janvier

Par Pierre Arnaud, 31 janvier 2011 15:55

La newletter n° 12, janvier 2011, est à présent disponible. Au sommaire :

  • Le congrès international logistique
  • L’intelligence économique (interview de Jean-Louis Recordon
  • Le voyage à Bruxelles du Master
  • Le documentaire « Inside Job »
  • L’avenir de la voiture électrique
  • Profil : Nicola Mirc, professeur de stratégie pour dans le Master
  • Développement durable
  • Interview d’une ancienne
  • La promotion 2010-2011

Voir aussi les autres newsletters >>

Le Master AINI classé 3e par le MOCI

Par Pierre Arnaud, 31 janvier 2011 15:19

Dans son édition du 23 décembre 2010, le Moniteur du commerce international classe le Master AINI en troisième position de son palmarès des formations universitaires au commerce international. Parmi les points forts notés par le MOCI, les missions en entreprises en cours d’année universitaire (parrainages) et la collaboration avec les Conseillers du commerce extérieur des Hauts de seine (CCE92).

L’article au format pdf (clique droit pour télécharger).
le site du MOCI.

The Liquidation Trap

Par Pierre Arnaud, 9 février 2009 17:26

The Liquidation Trap

The U.S. financial system is caught in a destructive liquidation trap that has falling asset prices cause financial distress, in turn compelling further asset sales and price declines. If unaddressed, it risks sending the economy into deep recession — or even depression.

Current conditions are the result of bursting of the house price bubble and the end of two decades of financial exuberance. That exuberance was fostered by a cocktail of forces.

First, economic policy replaced wages and productive investment as the engines of growth with debt and asset inflation. Second, greed and free market ideology combined to promote excessive risk-taking and restrain regulators. This was encouraged by audacious claims that mathematical economic models mapped reality and priced uncertainty, making old-fashioned precautions redundant.

Recognition of the scale of financial folly has created a rush for liquidity. This is causing huge losses, triggering margin calls and downgrades that cause more selling, damage confidence, and further squeeze credit. That is the paradox of deleveraging. One firm can, but the system as a whole cannot.

Having failed to prevent the bubble, regulatory policy is now amplifying its deflation. One reason is mark-to-market accounting rules that force companies to take losses as prices fall. A second reason is rigid capital standards.

Application of mark-to-market rules in an environment of asset price volatility can create a vicious cycle of accounting losses that drive further price declines and losses. Meanwhile, capital standards require firms to raise more capital when they suffer losses. That compels them to raise money in the midst of a liquidity squeeze, resulting in fresh equity sales that cause further asset price declines.

Bad debts will have to be written down, but it is better to write them down in orderly fashion rather than through panicked deleveraging that pulls down good assets too.

This suggests regulators should explore ways to relax capital standards and mark-to-market rules. One possibility is permitting temporary discretionary relaxations akin to stock market circuit breakers.

Later, regulators must tackle the underlying problem of price bubbles. Currently, central banks are only able to control bubbles by torpedoing the economy with higher interest rates. New flexible measures of control are needed. One proposal is asset based reserve requirements, which systematically applies adjustable margin requirements to the assets of financial firms.

The Fed must also lower interest rates, and not just for standard reasons of stimulating spending. Lower short term rates are needed to make longer term assets (including houses) relatively more attractive, thereby shifting demand to them and putting a bottom to asset price destruction.

Fears about a price — wage inflation spiral remain misplaced. Instead, the threat is deep recession triggered by the liquidation trap. If inflation is a wild card, now is the time to use the credibility the Fed has earned. Emergency rate reductions can be reversed when the situation stabilizes.

The great irony is central banks can produce liquidity costlessly. Usually the problem is restraining over-production: today, it is over-coming political concerns about “bail-outs”. Those concerns are legitimate, but they also risk inappropriately restricting liquidity provision and unintentionally imposing huge costs of deep recession.

At the moment the Fed is protecting banks and the treasury dealer network but leaving the rest of the system in the cold. That is perverse given how the Fed went along with expansion of the non-bank financial system. Instead, the Fed should consider an auction facility that makes longer duration loans available to qualified insurance and finance companies too.

The facility’s guiding principle should be an expanded version of the Bagehot rule. Accordingly, the Fed would auction funds at punitive rates, with loans being fully collateralized. The goal should be to facilitate repair of distressed financial companies with minimum market disruption and at no taxpayer expense. By creating an up-front facility, the Fed can get ahead of the curve and reduce need for crisis interventions that are always more costly and disruptive.

Among financial conservatives there is a view that financial markets deserve punishment for their “sins” and only that will cleanse them. This view is often presented in terms of need to restore market discipline and stay moral hazard.

The view from the left is strangely similar, arguing Wall Street “fat cats” need to be punished. Asset prices should fall, banks must eat their losses, and all but the most essential financial firms should be allowed to fail.

Both views have a moralistic dimension, and both risk unnecessary economic suffering. The mistakes of the past cannot be undone. All that can be done is to minimize their costs and then truly reform the system so that they are not repeated.

Copyright Thomas I. Palley

CDS: le monstrueux contraire d’une assurance

Par Pierre Arnaud, 9 février 2009 17:24

CDS: le monstrueux contraire d’une assurance

Par Paul Jorion, 16 septembre 2008

Ce texte est un « article presslib’» (*)

Samedi après-midi, les meilleurs spécialistes des Credit-Default Swaps travaillant pour Wall Street furent rappelés d’urgence au bureau. Devant le refus du gouvernement de contribuer au fonds de soutien de Lehman Brothers, ils furent extraits de force à leur environnement familial pour aller calculer combien il en co?ɬªterait d’honorer ces fameux CDS si Lehman devait faire défaut.

Rien de surprenant: dans mon billet du matin-même, Lehman Brothers: les proches sont à son chevet, j’écrivais:

Il n’y a plus que des infrastructures à se partager comme dépouilles et… l’écheveau à démêler des paris que tous ces braves gens ont pris sur la mauvaise santé financière les uns des autres sous la forme de Credit-Default Swaps.

Je rappelle en quelques mots qu’un Credit-Default Swap est un type d’assurance contractée à titre privé où le vendeur du swap joue le rôle d’assureur et l’acheteur, d’assuré. Le vendeur remboursera à l’acheteur les pertes que ce dernier viendrait à subir du fait de la défaillance d’un tiers. Pour bénéficier de ce service, l’acheteur du swap verse au vendeur une prime dont le montant est déterminé par le marché en fonction du risque de perte tel qu’il est alors perçu.

La somme totale des CDS contractés aux États-Unis se monte – cela dépend des sources – à 45 ou 62 mille milliards de dollars[1], de toute manière un chiffre proche du total des dépôts bancaires à l’échelle mondiale. L’instrument a été mis au point dans les années 1990 par J.P. Morgan, qui est aujourd’hui encore le principal acteur de ce marché, avec un chiffre de 7 mille milliards de dollars. Citigroup suit, avec 3,2 mille milliards et Bank of America avec 1,6 mille milliards de dollars. Les « hedge funds», les fonds d’investissement spéculatifs, représentent 31 % de ce marché, et les monolines, les rehausseurs de crédit, 8 %.

Bien qu’il présente l’aspect extérieur d’une assurance, il n’est pas nécessaire que l’acheteur du swap soit véritablement exposé au risque couvert. En fait, et le plus souvent, les CDS ne constituent que des paris « directionnels» à but spéculatif. Les établissements financiers ont recouru jusqu’à plus soif à de tels paris portant sur leur bonne santé respective: la somme du montant des contrats représente environ dix fois les pertes qui seraient effectivement subies – je veux dire en l’absence de tels paris. Les CDS ont donc démultiplié artificiellement par dix le risque réel qui préexistait à leur création, créant ainsi le monstrueux contraire d’une assurance.

L’été dernier, quand le crédit s’est tari, les établissements financiers se sont retrouvés englués dans la toile d’interdépendance que les Credit-Default Swaps avait créée entre eux. Cette interdépendance a contribué à fragiliser la partie du système financier qui avait été épargnée par la crise du subprime puisque la chute de l’un d’entre eux risque de se répercuter alors à l’ensemble des autres avec lesquels il est interconnecté, créant un risque systémique de type « dominos».

Le 2 avril, Ben Bernanke, le président de la Fed, déclarait dans une allocution devant le Congrès: « La faillite soudaine de Bear Stearns aurait débouché sur un débouclage chaotique de positions sur ces marchés. Elle aurait aussi jeté la suspicion sur les positions financières de certaines parmi les milliers de contreparties de Bear Stearns». La faillite de Bear Stearns aurait forcé au débouclage de l’ensemble des CDS dont elle faisait l’objet, c’est-à-dire à la réconciliation des positions de l’ensemble des établissements qui s’étaient engagés dans de tels contrats, l’insolvabilité de l’un des vendeurs pouvant alors se répercuter sur toute la longueur de la chaîne.

Il y a quelques jours, un commentateur sur un blog financier faisait observer à propos des CDS qu’il s’agit avec eux de « probabilités conditionnelles», la condition en question étant le fait que le marché soit encore opérationnel lorsque les défaillances se manifestent. « Comment imaginer», disait-il, « que Goldman Sachs étant en défaut de paiement, Lehman Brothers [toujours en vie à l’époque] puisse me verser les sommes qu’il me doit sur les CDS qu’il m’a vendus? Pas @#%& très probable!»

Paul Jorion, sociologue et anthropologue, a travaillé durant les dix dernières années dans le milieu bancaire américain en tant que spécialiste de la formation des prix. Il a publié récemment L’implosion. La finance contre l’économie (Fayard: 2008 )et Vers la crise du capitalisme américain? (La Découverte: 2007).

* Un « article presslib’» est libre de reproduction en tout ou en partie à condition que le présent alinéa soit reproduit à sa suite. Paul Jorion est un « journaliste presslib’» qui vit exclusivement de ses droits d’auteurs et de vos contributions. Il pourra continuer d’écrire comme il le fait aujourd’hui tant que vous l’y aiderez. Votre soutien peut s’exprimer ici.

US Economy: Rudderless and Reeling From Direct Hits

Par Pierre Arnaud, 9 février 2009 17:22

US Economy: Rudderless and Reeling From Direct Hits

By Paul Craig Roberts

We were promised a « New Economy » of high-tech tradable services to take the place of the offshored manufacturing economy. Wondering what had become of the « New Economy, » Duke University’s Offshoring Research Network searched for it and located it offshore. Yes, the activities of the « New Economy » are also outsourced offshore.

Call centers, IT operations, back-office operations, and manufacturing have long been moved offshore. Now high-value-added proprietary activities such as research and development, engineering, product development, and analytical services are being sent offshore. All that’s left is finance, and it is crumbling before our eyes.

Independent broker-dealers are disappearing: Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers. These venerable institutions were too thinly capitalized for the risks that they took. Merrill Lynch is now part of the Bank of America, and Lehman Brothers is history.

Ill-advised financial deregulation led to financial concentration and not to more efficient markets. Independent local banks, which focused on financing local businesses, and Saving and Loan Associations, which knew the local housing market, have been replaced with large institutions that package unanalyzed risks and sell them worldwide.

Regulation over-reached. The pendulum swung. Deregulation became an ideology and a facilitator of greed.

Deregulating electric power gave us Enron.

Deregulating the airlines destroyed famous American brand names such as Pan Am, shrank the number of companies, and caused a decline in service. When airlines were regulated, they could afford standby equipment, and cancelled flights were rare. Today, the bottom line prohibits standby equipment, and mechanical problems result in cancelled flights. When economists calculated the benefits of deregulation, they left out many of its costs.

There are no longer any blue chip companies, which means that investing for retirement has become a crapshoot. People realize this; thus, the privatization of Social Security has no support.

If we look realistically at the US economy, we see that what is not moved offshore is being bailed out. Last year, the US Department of Energy was authorized to make $25 billion in loans to auto manufacturing firms and suppliers of automotive parts. Last week the Secretary of the Treasury took $5 trillion dollars in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac home mortgages under its wing.

The Congressional Budget Office says this action by the Treasury means « that the operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be directly incorporated into the federal budget. » Their revenues would be treated as federal revenues, and their expenditures as federal expenditures. If the former were greater than the latter, there would be no reason for the takeover.

The open question is: what do these new liabilities do to the Treasury’s own credit standing?

For now, this question is submerged. The traditional practice of fleeing to the US dollar and US Treasury bonds during periods of financial stress and uncertainty has boosted the dollar and kept interest rates low. But sooner or later the large US budget deficit, worsened by recession and bailouts, and the large trade deficit, which requires constant recycling of dollars held by foreigners into US financial and real assets, will result in renewed effort on the part of foreigners to lighten their dollar holdings.

When this time arrives, US interest rates will have to rise in order for the government to be able to continue to rely on foreigners to recycle the dollars acquired in trade to finance the US government’s annual budget deficit.

The current financial problems have pushed into the background the larger problems of the US budget and trade deficits. Goods and services for American markets that US corporations outsource offshore return as imports, which widen the US trade deficit. Moving production offshore reduces US GDP and employment and increases foreign GDP and employment. Moving production offshore reduces the export capacity of the US economy while raising the import bill.

Therefore, how is the trade deficit to be closed? One way is through the dollar’s loss in exchange value, which would reduce American consumers’ real incomes and leave them too poor to purchase the offshored goods and services.

How is the budget deficit to be closed when jobs are disappearing and GDP (tax base) is being relocated offshore?

Not by higher taxes. Higher taxes are problematic for a recessionary economy in which unemployment, properly measured, is already in double digits (www.shadowstats.com).

Some people have speculated that the budget deficit will be closed by dismantling entitlement programs such as Medicare. However, considering the cost of medical insurance, this would be catastrophic for tens of millions of older Americans.

The more likely avenue will be a raid on private pensions. The Clinton administration’s appointee, Alicia Munnell, as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy argued that private pensions should face a capital levy to make up for the fact that their accumulation was tax free. I expect that the federal government, faced with its own bankruptcy, will resurrect this argument, as it will be preferable to printing money like a banana republic or Weimar Germany.

In the 21st century, the US economy has been kept going by debt expansion, not by real income growth. Economists have hyped US productivity growth, but there is no sign that increased productivity has raised family incomes, an indication that there is a problem with the productivity statistics. With consumers overloaded with debt and the value of their most important asset–housing–falling, the American consumer will not be leading a recovery.

A country that had intelligent leaders would recognize its dire straits, stop its gratuitous wars, and slash its massive military budget, which exceeds that of the rest of the world combined. But a country whose foreign policy goal is world hegemony will continue on the path to destruction until the rest of the world ceases to finance its existence.

Most Americans, including the presidential candidates and the media, are unaware that the US government today, now at this minute, is unable to finance its day to day operations and must rely on foreigners to purchase its bonds. The government pays the interest to foreigners by selling more bonds, and when the bonds come due, the government redeems the bonds by selling new bonds. The day the foreigners do not buy is the day the American people and their government are brought to reality.

This is not the financial position of a superpower.

Will what happened to Lehman Brothers today be America’s fate tomorrow?

Paul Craig Roberts [email him] was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury during President Reagan’s first term. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal. He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He was awarded the Legion of Honor by French President Francois Mitterrand. He is the author of Supply-Side Revolution : An Insider’s Account of Policymaking in Washington; Alienation and the Soviet Economy and Meltdown: Inside the Soviet Economy, and is the co-author with Lawrence M. Stratton of The Tyranny of Good Intentions : How Prosecutors and Bureaucrats Are Trampling the Constitution in the Name of Justice. Click here for Peter Brimelow’s Forbes Magazine interview with Roberts about the recent epidemic of prosecutorial misconduct.


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